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RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL:
THE EMERGING ISSUE OF STATES' RIGHTS
HON. JOHN F. SEIBERLING*
M ARCH 28, 1979, marked the beginning of a new public awareness and
attitude toward nuclear power. On that day, what some scientists,
industry officials and government spokesmen said would never happen did
happen-a serious accident of critical magnitude crippled a nuclear power
facility, releasing undetermined amounts of radiation into the atmosphere.
Communities within a fifty mile radius were threatened with unimaginable
chaos and disruption in the event a core meltdown forced mass evacuation.
The events of Three Mile Island forced industry, government and the
public to reassess the vision of nuclear power as a key solution to the
energy crisis. As an outgrowth of this reassessment, the public began to
demand a greater role in determining the development of nuclear power
within their communities, and the public began to demand greater protection
from the radiation hazards of nuclear waste transported through their
communities. When the city of Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio for example, heard
that radioactive waste from Three Mile Island was being trucked through
the state, the city council passed an ordinance to place safety and security
conditions on any such transports through city boundaries,1 thus showing
the concern which had already been expressed by officials in larger com-
munities where accidents resulting in radiation leakage could result in a
disaster of tragic proportions.'
States also have become increasingly responsive to public demands
to prevent nuclear waste from being stored near their communities. State
activity to prevent, limit, or prohibit outright the creation of nuclear waste
facilities within the states' jurisdiction is not solely an outgrowth of Three
Mile Island. Prior to March 28, 1979, sixteen states had approved legis-
lation giving themselves either an equal role or a final say in federal
decisions to store or dispose of radioactive waste within their boundaries.3
Subsequent to March 28, 1979, the New Mexico legislature enacted a
law prohibiting storage or disposal of radioactive waste in the state until
and unless the state shall have concurred through a process to be estab-
lished by a joint interim legislative committee. On May 30, 1979, the
*Member of Congress, 1971-present; LL.B., Columbia University, 1949. I am deeply in-
debted to Suzanne Goulet of my staff for her work in researching and preparing the initial
draft of this article.
I CUYAHOGA FALLs, OHIO, CODE § 17 (1979).
2 NEW YORK, N.Y., HEALTH CODE, § 175.111 (1976).
'Alaska, California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas and Vermont..
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Ohio Senate approved legislation"8 to prohibit the federal government
from storing radioactive waste within the state at least through 1983.
If Ohio's bill is enacted into law, eighteen states will have claimed
for themselves the authority to block federal decisions which may not ade-
quately safeguard against accidents, leakage, spills or operational failures
involving the transportation, storage and use of nuclear materials. Since
radiation hazards which result from nuclear waste are not only potentially
fatal but can endure literally for thousands of years, and with no national
program of radioactive waste disposal on the horizon, this concern is well
founded.
However, the laws passed by these states may run afoul of the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution. Regardless of the dimensions of the problem of
disposing and safeguarding radioactive waste, the states' rights to impose
conditions, or require prior consultation on potential waste disposal sites
within their jurisdiction can be challenged in court, even in the absence
of a federal solution, and have been challenged successfully. The purpose
of this article is to examine the issue of the state role in federal nuclear
programs and the need for Congressional action to insure that states will
have an active role in federal decisions to dispose of radioactive waste within
their jurisdictions.
I. THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT
The Manhattan project brought a terrifying end to World War II
and a hopeful beginning to the age of nuclear energy. However, since nu-
clear power was inexorably linked to weapons systems and national security,
the federal government retained exclusive control over the development
of atomic energy. In 1946, the Atomic Energy Act created the Atomic
Energy Commission as the controlling federal agency, and restricted all
private activity to fulfilling contractual obligations for the federal gov-
ernment.' Gradually, as nuclear power was developed to produce energy, and
a domestic, peacetime application of the science became possible, the federal
government invited industry to participate in making this application a reality.
In 1954, Congress amended the Atomic Energy Act to allow increased
participation by private industry through the establishment of a regulatory
and licensing system.' It was later still that Congress approved legislation
which gave states limited authority over certain kinds of nuclear materials,
based on the recognition of state interest in "peaceful uses of atomic energy."'
However, the policy Congress had established is based on the conclusion
BaS.B. 11, 113th Ohio Gen. Assemb., (1979). At the time of this writing (Feb. 1980) the
bill is pending before the Ohio House Committee on Agriculture and Natural Resources.
' Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755.
5 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 919, as amended by 42 U.S.C. § 2011
et seq. (1976).
e Atomic Energy Act of 1959, 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (a) (1976).
[Vol. 13:2
2
Akron Law Review, Vol. 13 [1980], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol13/iss2/2
RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL
that the processing and use of nuclear materials is "vital to the common
defense and security."' Thus, a federal agency (the Atomic Energy Com-
mission, which in 1974, was designated the Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission) has been assigned full regulatory authority over the use of nuclear
materials for commercial, peacetime purposes.
While the federal pre-emption over nuclear weapons development is a
logical and defensible policy, it may be argued that continued federal
pre-emption in uses of nuclear power for domestic purposes is an outdated
application of the policy, especially in light of the expanded role of private
industry. The nuclear industry asserts that excessive regulation by the
federal government serves to impede the development of nuclear power
as a major energy source in this country while states and citizen groups are
more concerned about the dangers of nuclear power than ever before.
From one side the federal government is being encouraged to smooth
the way for the increased use of nuclear power for domestic energy needs,
while from the other side the states are trying to cut from the federal regu-
latory fabric, on a state-by-state basis, a role for them to play, in partner-
ship with the federal government, to represent the concerns of their citizens
about the dangers of nuclear power and nuclear materials-including spent
fuel-to public health and safety.
II. FAILURES OF FEDERAL REGULATORY SYSTEM
The problems of nuclear waste disposal are enormous. Currently,
we have about seventy-four million gallons of radioactive waste in this
country, all in temporary storage at plant-sited "pools"; and there are an
additional eighty million gallons of defense nuclear waste which has ac-
cumulated since the military began producing nuclear weapons in the 1940's.
The military high-level waste have been stored at the Hanford Reservation
in Washington State, the Savannah River reserve in South Carolina, and
the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory in Idaho.8
The fission products contained in this waste are highly toxic elements,
including the so-called transuranic elements; radioactive atoms heavier than
uranium, which remain radioactive for extremely long periods of time.
Plutonium-239, for example, has a half-life of almost twenty-five thousand
years.' In human terms, the continued radioactive hazard is infinite. Even
if radioactive waste storage could guarantee that no human exposure
would occur for the life of the toxicity of the material, reactor waste must
be isolated from the rest of the environment to prevent penetration and
contamination of the biosphere, including food chains leading to man.
*Id. at § 2021 (a) (1) (1976).
sUNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE INTERAGENCY
REvIEw GROUP ON NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT (App. D) (1979) [Hereinafter cited as
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT].
9A. Kudo & D. Rose, Disposal of Nuclear Wastes, 182 SCIENCE 1205-1211 (1973).
Fall, 1979]
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This is a monumental problem, and even experts admit that no proven
solutions to this problem exist at the present time.
The federal government, through the Department of Energy, has the
prime responsibility for nuclear waste management. ° However, the history
of federal management of radioactive waste does not inspire public confi-
dence in the existence of any long-term solutions to the problems of dis-
posing nuclear waste, and the doubts expressed by the federal government
itself through various agencies about current technological solutions to
the radioactive waste problem point to the need for a thorough and public
examination of all issues related to nuclear waste disposal.
The experience at the Hanford Reservation in Washington provides
the best example of faulty assessments and planning by federal agencies
for nuclear waste disposal. Millions of gallons of high-level waste were
stored in liquid form in single-shell stainless steel and carbon tanks, which
were originally expected to have a life expectancy of about fifty years.
However, unexpected stresses resulted in failures before twenty years had
passed, leaking over 423,500 gallons of high level wastes from sixteen
tanks. The largest leak was discovered on June 8, 1973 when one tank was
found to have leaked a total of 115,000 gallons amounting to 54,000
curies of radioactivity. The leak occurred over a period of months. (The
extent of the leak was attributable in part to the absence of a key employee,
whose substitute ignored signals from the monitoring system that some-
thing had gone wrong.) 1' The deficiencies in the storage technology at
Hanford were previously known. In 1969, the General Accounting Office
had warned that corrosion problems would exist with single-shell tanks,"
but these warnings were ignored. Moreover, intermediate level radioactive
wastes (up to 1 curie per gallon) were at first merely dumped in open
trenches and absorbed into the sandy ground at Hanford.
The Department of Energy, which has authority to manage military
as well as commercial radioactive waste, has embarked on a program to
solidify the Hanford waste to prevent future leaks. Originally, as a part
of the program, the Department of Energy proposed to store the military
waste at a Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) now being developed in
New Mexico. The proposal has been modified since its initiation to use
WIPP as a storage facility for transuranic wastes, such as contaminated
clothing. While WIPP may be based on more advanced technology than
was originally used at Hanford, past experience indicates that even technical
10 Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977, 42 U.S.C. § 7133 (a) (8) (1976).
11 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, UNITED STATES ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
ADMINISTRATION, RADIOACTIVE WASTES AT THE HANFORD RESERVATION (1978).
12 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON
ATOMIC ENERGY, PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS IN PROGRAMS FOR MANAGING HIGH-LEvEL RADIO-
ACTIVE WASTE (1971).
(Vol. 13:2
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experts have no confidence that their favored method of storing radio-
active waste can be safely and surely implemented. Moreover, any dis-
posal efforts would be subject to the hazards of accidents in transport, leaks
of liquids pending solidification, or breakup or leaching into groundwater.
(If the Administration lifts its current moratorium on reprocessing, addi-
tional hazards would be added to the problems of temporary and long
term storage.)
Faulty selection criteria have further obstructed the government search
for an "ideal" waste disposal site. In 1955, the National Academy of Science
Research Council (NASRC) was directed by the Atomic Energy Com-
mission to examine the possibility of developing waste disposal facilities for
radioactive materials. NASRC tentatively concluded in a 1957 research
proposal that the best possibility was deep disposal in a geologic repository.'"
As a result of this initial conclusion, more engineering knowledge is avail-
able on salt mines than for any other method of radioactive waste disposal.'
Some of the knowledge points to the potential instability of salt because
of its plasticity and variable solubility. 5 Nonetheless, by 1970, the Atomic
Energy Commission had spent one hundred million dollars and fifteen
years to identify what they determined would be the final solution to the
problem of disposing radioactive waste; an abandoned salt mine in Lyons,
Kansas which would isolate radioactive waste permanently. The Kansas
Geological Society, in an independent assessment of the selected site, raised
questions about the site's safety, which was pockmarked with old oil and
gas wells that penetrated the salt, providing an entrance for water from
nearby operating mines. The Atomic Energy Commission later abandoned
the site, admitting that the potential of water intrusion could leach out
radioactive waste stored at the site.
These experiences point to the faulty technology and criteria which
have been employed by the federal government to develop a radioactive
waste disposal program. In fact, the government no longer claims to possess
solutions to the safety and security problems of long-term radioactive waste
disposal. The most recent report on this issue, the Interagency Review
Group report on Nuclear Waste Management 6 (a Presidential Commission
which completed a report in March, 1979), had these conclusions concern-
ing existing technology for preventing the potential exposure of humans
to radioactive waste disposed of on a "permanent" basis:
i3 THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE DISPOSAL OF
RADIOACTIVE WASTE ON LAND (1957).
14 D. JOHNSON & S. GONZALES, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, SALT DEPOSITS IN
THE UNITED STATES AND REGIONAL GEOLOGIC CHARACTERISTICS IMPORTANT FOR STORAGE OF
RADIOACTIVE WASTE (1978); REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 8, at 60.
15 A. Kubo & D. Rose, supra note 9, at 1207; DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, SUBGROUP REPORT
ON ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGY STRATEGIES FOR THE ISOLATION OF NUCLEAR WASTE (1978).
leH.R. REP. No. 95-1090, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1978).
Fall, 1979]
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The risk assessments performed to date.., have, with few exceptions,
been based on idealized repository characteristics and are subject to
significant uncertainties... Uncertainties associated with risk assessment
derive from lack of data, lack of experience, inability to identify all
release mechanisms for radionuclides, the natural variability in phy-
sical properties of geologic media, and the inability to predict long-
term geologic and climatic process and social evolution. All of these
uncertain ties are neither additive nor of equal significance. An im-
portant aspect of the research remaining to be done is to understand
how each enters into the overall uncertainty of the calculation of risk."
The absence of federal solutions, following past failures, gives rise to
another problem, which the Government Accounting Office described in
a 1977 report:
When it publicly announced its waste repository program objectives
and goals the Department (of Energy) may have promised more than
it can deliver. There are, we believe, formidable social, geological and
regulatory problems which must be solved. Foremost among them is
opposition of public and some political leaders. The Department may
not be successful in gaining their acceptance unless it can convince
the public that is has a sound waste management program and that
geological disposal risks to man's environment are acceptably low."
It is in this context-the absence of a federal program which promotes
confidence-that seventeen states have already institutionalized their op-
position to unilateral efforts by the federal government to bury radioactive
wastes.
III. FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION
The states' laws giving them a role in federal radioactive waste man
agement programs vary in the method, but essentially all achieve the purpose
of reviewing and overriding a proposed federal action within their juris-
diction. However, in the absence of clear Congressional directive authorizing
the states to have a role in such decisions, these state laws may be pre-empted
by federal authority established under the Atomic Act as amended. 9
In any inquiry into federal pre-emption it must first be established that
the area is subject to federal regulation pursuant to authority designated
by the Constitution. The findings of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended,
clearly base the regulation of nuclear materials on constitutional powers
over the common defense and security, interstate and foreign commerce and
promotion of the general welfare."0 As observed by the Eighth Circuit Court
17 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 8, at 45-46.
18 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE SENATE COMMITTE
ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WoRKs, NUCLEAR ENERGY'S DILEMMA: Disposing of Hazard-
ous Radioactive Waste Salely (1977).
19U.S.C. § 2011 et seq. (1976).
2 0 1d. at § 2012 61976).
[Vol 13:2
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of Appeals in North States Power Company v. Minnesota, "... there can
be no doubt but that Congress was acting within its constitutionally delegated
authority in establishing a system of regulation over the entire spectrum
of atomic energy, including the imposition of federal controls over health
and safety standards."'"
Once it has been established that the Constitution empowers the
federal government to regulate the subject under question, it must be
determined whether Congress intended or designed federal authority to
pre-empt states from asserting their authority over the same subject.
"The doctrine of Federal pre-emption is based on Article VI, Clause
2 of the United States Constitution, the Supremacy Clause, which elevates
federal law above that of the States."2 The Clause states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
anything in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary
notwithstanding.
The Atomic Energy Act does provide for a state role in regulating
health hazards of certain radioactive materials. In 1959, Congress approved
provisions which recognized state interest in peaceful uses of nuclear energy,
and to promote an orderly regulatory pattern between the Commission and
State governments with respect to nuclear development and use and regu-
lation of byproduct, source, and special nuclear materials."2 The provision
still requires the Commission to retain control over certain activities, in-
cluding the management and disposal of such nuclear waste which, in the
Commission's determination, cannot be disposed of without a license. An-
other provision states that no restrictions on state activity will prevent state
or local authorities from regulating activities for purposes other than "pro-
tection against radiation hazards. 12 4 (As will be shown, these provisions
have been interpreted by the courts not to be relinquishing federal authority
to the states, but to narrowly define a subject over which the state can
regulate.)
Federal pre-emption can be assumed if it is physically impossible
to comply with both federal and state regulations. In such a situation "a
holding of federal exclusion of state law is inescapable and requires no in-
quiry into congresssional design."2 5 However, in the absence of a direct
21447 F.2d 1143, 1147 (8th Cir. 1971).
'2Id. at 1145.
2342 U.S.C. § 2021 (b) (1976).
241d. at § 2021 (k) (1976).
25 Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143 (1963).
Fall, 19791
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collision between the two regulatory systems, it must be determined whether
Congress intended the federal regulatory scheme to be exclusive. This
must be assessed on a case by case basis since, "there is not - and from
the very nature of the problem there cannot be - any rigid formula or rule
which can be used as a universal pattern to determine the meaning and
purpose of every act of Congress."26 Where this intent is express, states
cannot exert authority over the same area.27 Otherwise, Congressional intent
may be gleaned by examining the statute, or its legislative history. 8
For example, "the scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive
as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the
states to supplement it,"' 9 or if "the state policy produces a result incon-
sistent with the objectives of the federal statute,""° or "stands as an ob-
stacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and ob-jectives of Congress,"'" then the state law and regulation is pre-empted by
federal law. For where the federal government has, pursuant to its con-
stitutional authority, enacted a system of regulation "States cannot, in-
consistently with the purposes of Congress, conflict or interfere with, curtail,
or complement, the federal law, or enforce law, or enforce additional or
auxiliary regulations." 2
The pre-emption of the Atomic Energy Act was challenged by the state
of Minnesota in Northern States Power Company. In this case Northern was
licensed by the Atomic Energy Commission to build a nuclear power plant
in Minnesota. Northern applied to the state for a waste disposal permit.
The state granted the permit upon the condition that Northern institute
a program at the nuclear plant to detect and measure radiation releases,
both liquid and gaseous. Since Northern was in compliance with federal
law and with the radiation safety regulations required by the Atomic Energy
Commission as a condition to licensing, Northern argued that Congress (in
passing the Atomic Energy Act) intended for the Commission to have ex-
clusive authority and control of nuclear plants, and therefore pre-empted
enforcement of the state regulation. Minnesota argued, on the other hand,
that it could regulate radioactive releases pursuant to the authority under
section 2021 (b) of the Atomic Energy Act, which defines the conditions
under which states could enter into cooperative agreements with the Com-
mission for the regulation of radiation hazards associated with by-products,
source and special nuclear material.
28 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
27447 F.2d at 1146.
28 373 U.S. at 146-152.
29 Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
30 Id.
i 312 U.S. at 67.
32 Id.
[Vol. 13:2
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The court examined this provision, and noted that the category of
radioactive material under question-liquid and gaseous releases from oper-
ating nuclear plants-was not among the categories of material over which
the state could assume control under section 2021 (b). The court further
examined the provision which specifically prohibited the Atomic Energy
Commission, in transferring certain authority to the states, from relinquishing
its authority over the construction and operation of any production or
utilization facility.33 Finding that the discharge of radioactive effluents
fell under the regulation of production and utilization facilities, the court
determined that the Minnesota law provided for dual control by state
and federal authority in an area where the sole authority rested with the
federal government.
The court found further indication that the federal act pre-empted
Minnesota's law in the legislative history of section 2021, to provide for
cooperative agreements between the Commission and states with respect
to state assumption of regulation over certain materials. The court noted
that, prior to the 1959 amendments, the regulation of all radioactive ma-
terials, including those for which regulation by agreement could be assumed
by the state (pursuant to section 2021), was solely under the regulatory
authority of the federal government:
While the 1959 amendment does not use the term 'exclusive' or
'sole' in describing existing regulatory responsibilities of the Commission
we think it abundantly clear that the whole tone of the 1959 amend-
ment, upon examination of the statutory language alone, demonstrates
Congressional recognition that the AEC at that time possessed the
sole authority to regulate radiation hazards associated with by-product,
source and special nuclear materials and with production and utiliza-
tion facilities... If the States at that time possessed concurrent juris-
diction to regulate radiation hazards associated with these materials,
it would have been unnecessary for Congress affirmatively to recognize
their regulatory authority by virtue of a state-federal compact and
to limit their authority for the duration of and subject to the provisions
of such agreement.3"
Thus the court concluded that the states' right to regulate radiation
hazards is specifically limited to those materials defined in section 2021 (b)
and does not extend to any other areas.
The court also examined the legislative intent of section 2021 (k)
which states that "nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the
authority of any state or local agency to regulate activities for purposes other
than protection against radiation hazard." Since the radiation hazards which
can be regulated by the states are clearly defined, the court interpreted
3342 U.S.C. § 2021 (c) (1976).
34 447 F.2d at 1149.
Fall, 1979]
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this as restating the restriction against any other state regulation of radi-
ation hazards of radioactive material."
Finally, the court found that the Minnesota law was preempted by
the Atomic Energy Act 6 because Minnesota's law obstructed the achievement
of the Act's goals "to encourage the development, use and control of atomic
energy so as to make the maximum contribution to the general welfare
and to increase the standard of living." 7 However, the Atomic Energy Act
provided that these objectives were to be effectuated "to the maximum
extent consistent with the common defense and security and with the
health and safety of the public."3" Congress determined that the achievement
of these goals required a comprehensive Federal regulatory program which,
the court concluded, prevented states from imposing stricter standards which
may impede the development and use of nuclear power. The court held
that "the federal government has exclusive authority under the doctrine
of preemption to regulate the construction and operation of nuclear power
plants which necessarily includes regulation of the levels of radioactive
effluents discharged from the plants."3 9
In a more recent case, Pacific Legal Foundation v. California
Energy Commission," the United States District Court for Southern Calif-
ornia held that the Atomic Energy Act pre-empted a state law which set
conditions on the future licensing of nuclear power plants in the state.
California Public Resources Code section 25524.2 prohibited the State
Energy Commission from licensing a nuclear power plant pending the
designation by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission of an approved tech-
nology for disposing of nuclear by-products of plant operation. Under this
section, the NRC was required to submit a report approving the designated
radioactive waste disposal technology to the state legislature, which was
empowered to "disaffirm" any recommendation or finding in the report.
In Pacific Legal Foundation, San Diego Gas and Electric Company
terminated the proposed construction of the Sundesert nuclear power project
in Southern California. Plaintiffs argued that the project had been terminated
because the California Energy Commission had determined that the re-
quired findings on a radioactive waste disposal technology were not avail-
able, resulting, at least for the time being, in a moratorium on nuclear
power plant licensing in the state.
The court, in examining the effect of California Public Resources
35 1d. at 1150.
3642 U.S.C. §§ 2011 & 2012 (1976).
37 447 F.2d at 1154.
8842 U.S.C. § 2013 (1976).
89 447 F.2d at 1154.
40 Civil No. 78-71 1-E (S.D. Cal. filed March 6, 1979).
[Vol. 13:2
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Code section 25524.2, observed that the result of the requirements made
on the NRC was to obstruct Congressional purpose in passage of the Atomic
Energy Act.
Congress' policy to encourage the development and utilization of nu-
clear energy would decidedly be frustrated if all fifty states had statutes
similar to California Public Resources Code section 25524.2. Although
the Atomic Energy Act certainly leaves room for the states to regulate
on the subject of nuclear energy within the confines of section 2021
(k) and 2021 (b), the power to regulate is not necessarily the power
to prohibit. There seems little point in enacting an Atomic Energy Act
and establishing a federal agency to promulgate extensive and per-
vasive regulations on the subject of construction and operation of
nuclear reactors and the disposal of nuclear waste if it is within the
prerogative of the states to outlaw the use of atomic energy within
their borders.'
In Pacific Legal Foundation, the court further elaborated on the argu-
ments forwarded in Northern States Power Company concerning the
limited application of section 2021 (k), the provision which reserves to
the states the right to regulate "activities for purposes other than protection
against radiation hazards." The defendants relied upon this section as
delegating authority to the states to regulate for purposes other than radi-
ation control. They argued that the provision allowed the state of California
to enact a law which would insure that state citizens would not be forced
to bear the financial risk of financing nuclear power plant construction if these
plants were later closed because inadequate waste disposal facilities existed."
This broad interpretation of section 2021 (k) was rejected by the court based
on an examination of legislative intent, since a wide scope for state au-
thority would effectively undermine the regulatory scheme established by
Congress in the Atomic Energy Act.
Rather, the court found that an examination of legislative history
led to the conclusion that Congress commanded the courts to interpret
section 2021 (k) in a manner consistent with section 2021 (c). To buttress
this interpretation, the court referred to a letter sent in 1959 by the General
Manager of the AEC by the Chairman of the Congressional Joint Com-
mittee on Atomic Energy. Regarding AEC's recommended language for
section 2021 (k) the letter said: "[w]e did not intend to leave any room
for the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction by the States to control radiation
from those materials. Our sole purpose was to leave room for the courts
to determine the applicability of particular State laws and regulations deal-
ing with matters on the fringe of the preempted area in the light of all the
provisions and purposes of the Atomic Energy Act, rather than in the
41 Id.
42 Id.
Fall, 19791
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fight of a single sentence."," Since this interpretation was accepted by the
Joint Committee, the court in Pacific Legal Foundation concluded that this
indicated "Congressional approval of the position that the precise extent
of preemption under the section is to be determined by the courts in the
light of all the provisions and purposes of the Atomic Energy Act."'
In light of the fact that the opportunity for states to regulate nuclear
materials under section 2021 (b) was clearly defined and concerned subject
matter previously under the sole authority of a federal agent,45 the court
held that section 2021 (k) did not extend authority to the state to protect
its citizens against nuclear plants which may lack adequate disposal facilities,
since the effect of such protection would be to obstruct the use of nuclear
power in the state contrary to the express purpose of the Atomic Energy
Act. Further, because authority to regulate use of radioactive materials
which present sufficient hazards to require licensing was retained by the
Atomic Energy Commission by virtue of section 2021 (c) of the Act,
the court held that "the state regulation on this subject is displaced. Ac-
cordingly, the court holds California Public Resources Code section 25524.2
impliedly pre-empted.""
These decisions certainly can be used as precedent to challenge state
laws which would require state concurrence in decisions on radioactive
waste disposal on the grounds that the Atomic Energy Act and regulation
made pursuant thereto preempt state laws and regulations on the subject
of the use and disposal of radioactive waste material.
In addition to the Atomic Energy Act, the Department of Energy
Organization Act of August 4, 1977 " gives specific authority to the De-
partment of Energy over nuclear waste management, with the exception
of those functions under the authority of the Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission. This means that DOE's authority does not cover the licensing of
radioactive waste for permanent disposal or any functions covered by NRC-
state agreements.
The Department of Energy Organization Act authorizes the federal
agency to provide for:
(C) the establishment of temporary and permanent facilities for stor-
age, management, and ultimate disposal of nuclear wastes;(D) the establishment of facilities for the treatment of nuclear wastes;(E) the establishment of programs for the treatment, management,
storage, and disposal of nuclear wastes."
48 Id.
"Id.
45 447 F.2d at 1149.
"6Civil No. 78-711-E.
47 The Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977, 42 U.S.C. § 7101 el seq. (Supp. I
1977).
4842 U.S.C. § 7311 (A) (8) (1977).
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While a provision in the Act does require the Department to give "due con-
sideration" to the needs of states where conflicts exist in the development
of national energy plans, 9 there is no authority in this Act which gives the
states a statutory basis for participating in the process of establishing nu-
clear waste facilities within their boundaries. In fact, the comprehensive
and specific DOE authority defined in section 7311 (8) over nuclear waste
management would probably give considerable weight to arguments that
the federal regulatory scheme is "so pervasive as to make reasonable the in-
ference that Congress left no room for the states to supplement it.""0 Any
state law which regulated the disposal of radioactive waste could be chal-
lenged on the basis that such state action was preempted by federal au-
thority under the Atomic Energy Act and the Department of Energy Or-
ganization Act.
III. STATES' RIGHTS AND NATIONAL GOALS
These ponderous legal obstacles do not seem to have dampened the
efforts of the states to participate in radioactive waste disposal decisions
to the extent of exercising authority to "veto" the selection of sites within
their jurisdictions. Considering the risk assessments associated with dis-
posal of radioactive waste, the duration of the hazard to public health and
environment inherent in radioactive waste, the past failures in the federal
government's efforts to manage radioactive waste and the growing public
concern about the dangers associated with nuclear power in general, the
states' interest is understandable. It also presents serious problems for the
implementation of a national radioactive waste disposal management pro-
gram, since without the cooperation of state and local officials, it could
be politically impossible for the federal government to develop a radio-
active waste disposal facility within a given state.
There is general agreement among federal officials that states must
have some role in decisions to store radioactive waste if such facilities are
to become a reality. In 1977, hearings before the House Interior Subcom-
mittee on Energy and the Environment, then-Chairman of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission Marcus A. Rowden said: "The matter of where
a repository is located is not simply a legal question. It is not simply a
technological question. It is a political question, and a political decision
is going to have to be made ... My own view remains that the basic prob-
lems with regard to waste management are national scope. They will have
to be addressed at the national level. Ultimately, it is going to be the Con-
gress through legislation which makes the final determination." '51
In 1979 hearings before the same Subcommittee, John M. Deutch,
4942 U.S.C. § 7113 (1977).
50 331 U.S. at 230.
5 1 Hearings before the Subcomm. on Energy and the Environment of the Comm. on Interior
and Insular Affairs of the House on HR 18 et al., 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1977).
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Director of Energy Research for the Department of Energy and Chairman
of the President's Interagency Review Group on Nuclear Waste, in an
exchange with the Chairman of the Subcommittee, Congressman Morris
Udall, talked about the problems of providing a state role without authoriz-
ing a state veto:
Deutch: The position of the administration has been against a legislative
veto right for States. On the other hand, we understand as a
practical matter and as a matter of public interest, that when you
are actually considering a specific facility in a specific State and
locality, you must have the State and local officials supporting
your program in terms of technical merit and consequences for
their areas.
Udall: It has been my own view, and maybe you will comment on this,
that as a practical matter, whether you give it to them or not -
if the Governor or the legislature or a large body of citizens in
any State do not want an installation in their State, it is going
to be extremely difficult for the federal government to force it
upon them.
Would you agree that that is a practical statement?
Deutch: Absolutely, yes, sir.52
The final report of the Interagency Review Group on Nuclear Waste
Management, issued in March 1979, reiterated the point that the federal
government was bound in its development of a federal radioactive waste
disposal program to work with the states. The final recommendations read:
"The IRG believes that the technical and socio-political success of any fed-
eral waste management program is largely dependent on the States; and
in particular the extent to which the states are involved early-on in pro-
gram planning research and development, site identification, site character-
ization, (and) development of regional programs.""3 However, the report
stopped short of recommending a state veto authority, finding that a state
veto had the potential of allowing the state "at one specific moment -
by one of several possible mechanisms - to approve or disapprove of
federal site investigation activities or a proposal to site a repository or
other facility.""4 Rather, the IRG recommended the establishment of a
"consultation and concurrence" process whereby the state could participate
on a continuing basis in all activities and "if it deems appropriate to prevent
the continuance of federal activities."55
The Department of Energy currently follows an internal policy which
532 Oversight hearings before the Subcomm. on Energy and the Environment of the Comm. of
Interior and Insular Affairs on the House on Nuclear Waste Management, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 11 (1979).
5
3 REPORT TO THE PRESDENT, supra note 8, at 95.
54 Id.
55 Id.
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subjects the approval of proposed locations for radioactive waste disposal
facilities to state concurrence-in effect allowing the states to "veto" po-
tential sites within their jurisdiction. In a letter dated June 19, 1978 from
the Comptroller General of the United States to Congressman John D.
Dingell, the Comptroller made reference to an agreement signed by the
Governor of Louisiana and the Deputy Secretary of DOE which stated that,
with respect to nuclear storage: "the Department of Energy will not construct
any nuclear waste depository for long-term disposal in Louisiana if the
State objects.""8 Since the legislative history of the Department of Energy
Organization Act contained nothing to support a conclusion that the states
could be given such a "veto" power by DOE, the Comptroller consulted
an internal memorandum from the Department of Energy's Office of Gen-
eral Counsel which concluded that "the Secretary of Energy under existing
law does not have the legal authority to enter into a binding agreement
with a state pursuant to which the state would have the power to veto
or forbid the establishment of a proposed nuclear waste repository in the
state." The Comptroller further held that without statutory authority permit-
ting such action, any agreements between officials of the Department of Energy
and states giving the state the power to reject a potential disposal site selected
by the Department would be legally unenforceable.
In further correspondence from the Department of Energy to Con-
gressman Dingell, the Secretary of Energy James Schlesinger indicated
that the Department was trying to develop a process for affected states
to participate in the selection of potential sites for the disposal of radio-
active waste. However, given the traditional Federal preemption of the
states on all issues related to nuclear materials, as interpreted by the courts,
DOE may require additional authority to implement a process for involving
states in nuclear waste management decisions. It is unlikely that the courts
would uphold the authority of DOE to create a role for the states if such
a role could be construed to obstruct the implementation of a federal radio-
active waste disposal program.
Several bills have been introduced in the 96th Congress to authorize
a role for the states to participate in or veto decisions by the Federal gov-
ernment to create radioactive waste disposal facilities within their juris-
diction.5
56 Letter from R.F. Keller to John D. Dingell (June 19, 1978).
57 At this writing, the bills are H.R. 1071, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. H 188
(1979), introduced by Rep. Joseph Moakley, which would authorize state legislative actions
or state referenda on storage proposal; H.R. 1791, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc.
H 436 (1979), introduced by Rep. James M. Hanley, which would subject federal proposals
to store radioactive waste to state legislature's review; S.1443, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125
CONG. REc. S8711 (1979), introduced by Senator John Durkin, to authorize approval by
state legislatures or Indian tribes of proposal radioactive waste disposal facilities; and H.R.
2762, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. 52408 (1979), to create a process for states to
participate in proposed radioactive disposal facilities decisions, and to approve or disapprove
of final disposal decisions.
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Although the House Interior Subcommittee on Energy and the En-
vironnent held a day of hearings on H.R. 2762 in June, 1979, it is un-
certain whether Congress will take any action to provide states an opportunity
to participate meaningfully in federal decisions on nuclear waste facility
siting. Opponents to state participation argue that enactment of such legis-
lation would result in all fifty states objecting to radioactive disposal facilities
proposed for their jurisdictions. However, the states are rejecting radioactive
waste even in the absence of statutory authority, and this trend will,
at the very least, delay the development and implementation of a national
radioactive waste management plan. The courts may, and in the absence
of a legislative solution, will dispose of the issue on the basis of legal
considerations. But the problem is essentially technical and political. A
final decision by Congress on nuclear waste disposal policy must accommo-
date both the national interest in solving the problem of radioactive waste
disposal and the responsibilities of the states for health and safety of their
citizens.
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